Dow Hahnville Leak

Summary Judgment Summarily Dismissed by Third Circuit in Vehicle Accident Case

Published on: April 23, 2012 | By Berniard Law Firm

A summary judgment is rendered when a trial court decides that there are no genuine issues of material fact that need to be determined. “Manifestly erroneous” is the high standard under which summary judgments are reversed on appeal. Summary judgments are cheaper and less time consuming than full blown trials; they are a means toward the end of judicial expediency, a goal that becomes increasingly important to our judicial system over time. Despite the importance of this procedural device, many cases do not call for summary judgment. Sometimes trial courts grant full or partial summary judgments in error and are reversed. That is what occurred in the case of Jagneux v. Frohn, which you can read here.

The defendants in this case convinced the trial court that no issues of fact existed that required litigating. Their legal journey was not over though due to the plaintiff’s appeal. The court of appeals applied the standard promulgated by the Louisiana Supreme Court. This Louisiana Supreme Court’s standard initially places the burden of proof on the party that is moving for a summary judgment. The moving party must prove that one or more elements of the adverse party’s claim or defense lacks any factual support on the record so far. The opposing party is then granted an opportunity to prove that there have been facts alleged that support that party’s position. At the time of summary judgment the record is sparse so a granting of summary judgment represents a finding by the court that no facts supporting a particular party’s, in this case the plaintiff’s, position.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision in this case because it found that the issue of whether Mrs. Kling, a defendant in this case, was the driver of the white SUV at the time that it, at least partially, caused the accident at issue in this case. Because there was conflicting evidence about where Mrs. Kling was and whether or not she was actually in control of the car at the time of the accident, summary judgment was not the right choice in this case. The trial court is not to weigh the merits of the case when addressing summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate in cases where no potentially meritorious case is presented by one of the parties.

Class Action Rules Difficult to Understand, Important for Successful Litigation

Published on: April 10, 2012 | By Berniard Law Firm

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was passed in an effort to prevent class action lawsuit abuse. CAFA changed the practice of class action litigation in state and federal courts. This change was accomplished by CAFA’s jurisdictional alterations in both the diversity and removal components of the traditional framework of class action practice, i.e. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In Williams v Homeland Insurance, the Fifth Circuit applied the “local controversy” exception of CAFA to the facts of the case, determining that a class arbitration is not, nor does it preclude a class action. Williams provides a lesson in the application of the elements of CAFA and an understanding of CAFA’s features. The decision also demonstrates yet another unique feature of Louisiana law that distinguishes it from the law of all of the other jurisdictions in the United States: the Louisiana Direct Action Statute.

CAFA changed the rules for federal diversity jurisdiction and removal. The Act enables large class action law suits to be filed in and/or removed to federal court. CAFA changed the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 from by raising the requirement from 40 class members to more than 100 class members; the citizenship requirement of Rule 23 by relaxing the diversity criteria, i.e. any class member must be diverse from any defendant; and the amount-in-controversy (from one named plaintiff having a claim of more than $75,000) to the total of $5 million. In addition, CAFA incorporated looser removal rules: in diversity cases any defendant can remove the case (including in-state defendants); any defendant can remove without the unanimous consent of the other defendants; there is no 1 year limit on the timing for removal of the case to another court’s jurisdiction; and the decision to grant or deny a remand is subject to appellate review.

Happy Holidays from the Berniard Law Firm

Published on: April 8, 2012 | By Berniard Law Firm

On behalf of the Berniard Law Firm, we hope that all of our friends and followers have had a relaxing and restful holiday. Posting will resume on Tuesday

A Happy Holidays to All Friends of the Berniard Law Firm

Published on: December 25, 2011 | By Berniard Law Firm

The Berniard Law Firm would like to wish everyone a Happy Holiday.

Regular posting will resume in 2012! Have a happy, and SAFE, holiday season!

The Importance of Defining Terms in a Contract

Published on: September 23, 2011 | By Berniard Law Firm

The terms in a contractual agreement between parties can have the effect of changing entire meanings of contracts. This is especially true in more complex litigation and more complex business agreements. If a business agreement requires the participation of multiple partners or parties, an ambiguously defined contract can have the effect of increasing the amount of litigation which will occur every time there is a legal dispute between any or all of the parties. The clear practical effect of writing clear-cut and well defined contracts is that, in the long run, there will be less of a chance that any dispute will require a long, drawn-out litigation process which has the effect of draining the wallets of all the parties involved.

This is most important where one or more of the parties is a single individual with limited resources, and in some situations, is represented by smaller firms that have much less financial resources compared to bigger business entities with more resources and financing at their disposal. As a legal practice, any person that becomes part of a contractual agreement should clearly define any type of ambiguous terminology in an effort to save the agreement from getting the definitional application of common law or practice. Never is this more necessary than when an individual is pushed up against an insurance agency that holds their financial future in their hands. The importance of defining a contract can be clearly seen in the case of Federal Insurance Company v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.

Both Federal and New Hampshire insurance companies became involved in litigation because they both insured Thomas and Betts Corporation (hereinafter T&B). T&B made a product which contributed to an explosion at an aluminum processing plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, leaving employee Wayne Robinson with injuries. Ultimately, Mr. Robinson sued T&B, which had liability insurance from both Federal and New Hampshire. Thus, when the suit began, Federal and New Hampshire’s policies kicked into effect. New Hampshire was the “first insurer” for T&B. Federal, on the other hand, was T&B’s second layer excess insurer. On the eve of the trial, Mr. Robinson came to an agreement with T&B which had the effect of potentially extinguishing the law suit. T&B was going to pay Mr. Robinson $5 million dollars in damages for his unfortunate bodily injuries, and an additional $1.2 million in consideration for a potential breach of contract claim by another plaintiff company against Mr. Robinson. Subsequent to this settlement, New Hampshire notified Mr. Robinson that it was going to pay him the $5 million, but that it would not pay him the $1.2 million promised by T&B. When Mr. Robinson then received a letter from the plaintiff company, he sent the notice to Federal to show the demand made of him. Federal ended up giving Mr. Robinson $990,000 for the potential breach of contract claim against Mr. Robinson. The pertinent part of the agreement between T&B and Mr. Robinson is as follows:

“Thomas and Betts and Its Insurers agree to hold harmless, indemnify and defend Wayne Robins, et al, The Fields law Firm and Cleo Fields for any amount owed to AXA, Kaisers Subrogated Property Reinsurers, Caleb Didriksen and the Didriksen Law Firm, not to exceed 1.2 million dollars.”

Eventually, Federal sought the $990,000 from New Hampshire arguing that the amount should have been given to Mr. Robinson as part of T&B’s policy with New Hampshire. New Hampshire argued that this amount was not within T&B’s policy with it. The pertinent part of T&B’s policy with New Hampshire was that New Hampshire, “becomes legally obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law or assumed by [T&B] under an Insured Contract because of Bodily Injury.” This seems simple enough, however there was no definition of “legally obligated to pay.” In the world of contracts, the contracting parties have the ability to define things in any manner they see fit. These definitions should, however, be included in the contract itself in the index of terms. When a contract does not define any of the material terms, the terms should be filled in by the court. In this case, the court decided that since the phrase was not defined, it should be filled in with what was commonly used in Louisiana. It Louisiana, it was well settled that the use of the phrase was for damages arising out of tortious actions and not from a contractual obligation. Therefore, on the face of the assertion, Federal would be out of luck because it sought money from New Hampshire for money it gave Mr. Robinson due to a breach of contract. Even though the court sided with Federal for other reasons, Federal would have been dealt a strict blow because it did not read the policy between T&B and New Hampshire clearly enough to see that the term was not defined.

Therefore, before taking any action any party should clearly read any existing agreement between relevant parties and should make sure any contract it signs has clearly defined terms that will not lead to unnecessary litigation which will only serve to drain resources.

Federal 5th Circuit Decides Excess Insurers Are Not Required To Pay Pre-Judgment Interest

Published on: September 16, 2011 | By Berniard Law Firm

In order to avoid extreme costs incurred from accidents, some businesses purchase two types of insurance policies. The first and most common type of insurance is primary insurance. Under this policy, business assets and liabilities are covered in exchange for the payment of a premium. This coverage, however, is capped in order to protect the insurance company from excessive claims. For this reason, many businesses, especially those dealing with expensive equipment and goods, will carry a second insurance policy that provides coverage beyond what is offered through the primary insurer. These policies are known as excess insurance. Premiums for these excess policies are often lower and provide a much higher cap on claim amounts. Excess insurers are able to provide such cheap, yet extensive coverage because the chance of such a catastrophic accident occurring that exhausts the primary insurance cap is minimal. However, as is evident in Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. American Commercial Lines, L.L.C., where multiple boats collided on the Mississippi River, maritime accident costs sometimes extend beyond primary insurance coverage, bringing questions of how excess insurance money should be handled by courts.

When insurance disputes arise, many times the insurance company will concede the full policy amount, deposit it with the court, withdraw from the proceedings, and leave the claiming parties to battle out their rights to the money in court. Statutory provisions guide the timeline for when primary insurance policies must be deposited with the court, but what is the protocol for an excess insurer that wants to follow the primary insurer’s footsteps? This was the main question in the American Commercial Lines case. The plaintiffs sued the excess insurers claiming that the excess insurers deposited the policy amount with the court too late, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars in interest that could have been distributed amongst the victims. In deciding the case the court had to analyze a couple different issues.

The first issue dealt with determining what law applies to the case. Since the case involves maritime insurance, the court had to decide between maritime law and state law. Statutes provide that if no federal maritime law controls the issue, then state law applies. Because no specific maritime provision covers when an excess insurer should deposit policy amounts with the court, Louisiana court applies. This means, as mentioned above, that excess insurance will not kick in until after all primary insurance funds have been exhausted. This essentially answers the question the second issue poses: when does the excess insurer need to deposit policy amounts with the court?

Understanding Class Action Lawsuits in Louisiana

Published on: June 16, 2011 | By Berniard Law Firm

Class actions are a common and popular legal tool for cases involving a large group of people who share the same grievance against a defendant. Specifically, the plaintiffs have to have a real and actual interest in order to join a class action. An issue may arise however, if a plaintiff’s interest is called into question. In particular, whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted against a defendant. Essentially, the plaintiff’s have to share the same type of complaint and injury in order to form a proper class action. Many times, defendants will allege that the class action was improperly certified (allowed) in order to invalidate any complaints against them.

In a recent Second Circuit Court of Appeal Case in Louisiana, the court explored the certification of a class action in order to determine whether or not it was proper. The facts of the case include the plaintiff, representing a class of individuals, who all share a grievance against a funeral home, owners of the funeral home, and numerous banks. The gist of their complaint is that the funeral home sold prepaid funeral expenses to the plaintiffs and other putative class members. The owner of the funeral home then deposited their payments into certificates of deposit (COD) with one or more of the banks named as defendants. The bulk of COD’s were under names which included the Funeral Home, followed by either “payable on death,” or “for the benefit of” followed by the name of the individual whose prepaid funeral funds were being held on deposit. The issue became that without presentation of a death certificate as required by Louisiana statute, the law governing prepaid funeral services, and in breach of the banks’ contracts, namely, the certificates of deposit, the funeral home was allowed by the banks to withdraw the funds which they converted and appropriated for their own use. The plaintiffs argue that by accepting the deposits, the defendant banks became commonly liable with the funeral home. Yet, the appellate court is charged with the responsibility to determine whether the class action should be certified, despite the fact the trial court denied the class’s certification.

A class action must have certain definite characteristics. First, the class must be so large as to make individual suits impractical. Second, there must be a legal or factual claim in common between all the plaintiffs involved. Third, the claims or defenses must be typical of the plaintiffs or defendants. Fourth, the representative parties must adequately protect the interest of the class. Further, in many cases, the party seeking certification of a class must also show that common issues between the class and the defendants will predominate the proceedings, as opposed to individual fact-specific conflicts between class members and the defendants and that the class action, instead of individual litigation, is a superior vehicle for resolution of the disputes at hand. Here, the class certification, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class defined as “all individuals from whom the funeral home appropriated and converted funds collected by them for prepayment of funeral expenses.” Additionally, the motion asserted common questions of law and fact including:

Fire Rages After New Iberia Chemical Plant Explosion

Published on: June 14, 2011 | By Berniard Law Firm

With little details available, the residents of New Iberia sit and wait to find out more about an explosion that took place at the Multi-Chem plant. Conflicting reports exist regarding harm caused by the incident, though the most recent release states all plant employees are accounted for and there were no reported injuries.

A 1-5 mile evacuation has taken place with residents encouraged to leave or, at worst, remain inside.

More information will be available on our Personal Injury blog as it becomes available.

Chemical Release Ruling a Helpful Guide for Recent Spills/Leaks

Published on: April 1, 2011 | By Berniard Law Firm

In Oakdale, Louisiana, on March 8th, 2000, a pressurized tank owned by Arizona Chemical Co., Inc., containing a heat transfer fluid over-heated. The tank had a safety shut off valve which failed, resulting in the short-term release of chemical vapor into the air. The vapor, containing biphenyl and phenyl oxide, drifted toward the home of a nearby resident, Ms. Edna Miller. The release was short lived and was contained within 30 minutes but caused very real damages. Edna and Bruce Miller sued Arizona Chemical Co, Inc., for personal injuries following the chemical release. As a result, Edna Miler was awarded $12,5000 in damages. However, Bruce Miller’s claim was denied as a verdict in favor of Arizona Chemical was issued.

Both parties appealed the decisions in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed Edna Miller’s award for $12,500 and refused to award her additional damages. Bruce Miller’s claim on appeal was also denied, and he was awarded no damages. Edna Miller was awarded damages while her son Bruce was not because he could not meet his burden of proof to show that the chemical release caused him any harm.
At the time of the exposure Edna was inside her home. Her son Bruce was at work, as a groundskeeper at a nearby high school. Mr. Miller left work to check on his mother when he heard about the chemical release. He found Edna outside on the lawn, nauseous, and about to leave the area. He helped her into her car and she drove away. Bruce Miler stayed on the property for several minutes, went in the house, had a glass of water and washed his face. He said his eyes and throat were burning and he felt shortness of breath.

Later that day Mrs. Miller visited the emergency room with heart palpitations, shortness of breath and nausea. She was released when she no longer had symptoms from the chemical release. Arizona Chemical company paid her medical bill and the bills of four other people that day who complained of symptoms related to the chemical release. Mr. Miller did not seek medical attention that day. He stated that five hours after the exposure he developed a rash on his hands. This rash was later found to be caused by his taking Celebrex and by his long time smoking habit, not from the chemical release. He has suffered skin rashes many times before in his life.

In order to recover damages for personal injury the injured party must prove that the other party was the primary, if not only, cause of the injury. Mr. Miller’s treating family practitioner testified that his breathing problems, rashes, and other symptoms were related to the chemical exposure. However, the physician did not know until the day of trial what chemical the Millers were exposed to, nor the type of ailments that particular substance could cause. The doctor said that the timing of the chemical release and Mr. Miller’s symptoms were what led him to that conclusion. The Defendant presented opinions of expert toxicologists who testified that Mr. Miller’s continuing symptoms could not have been caused by the brief transient exposure to the chemical vapor on March 8, 2000. Because Mr. Miller could not show that the cause of his symptoms was due to the chemical release, the Court of Appeals affirmed that he was not entitled to damages from Arizona Chemical Co., Inc.

Showing that an action by one party caused injury to someone can be complicated. The inured party must prove that their injury was caused by the other party and that the injury caused them some harm. In this case Mrs. Miller suffered some harm, but not harm requiring compensation more than the $12,500 the court said. Mr. Miller was not able to meet his burden of proof showing that the chemical release was the cause of his injuries and thus failed at his claim.

If you have suffered an injury due to chemical release or some other action of another party, you may be entitled to damages if you can meet the proper burden of proof. Whether or not a party has met their burden of proof is a question for the judge or jury and is essential to receiving compensation for personal injury. If you or someone you know has suffered an injury due to another party, an experienced attorney can help you determine if you may be able to meet the burden of proof to be awarded damages by the court.

Louisiana Residents With Personal Injury Questions

Published on: April 18, 2010 | By Berniard Law Firm

For those Louisiana residents, whether you live in Lake Charles, Shreveport, Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Kentwood or any other of the great cities across this state, looking for more information on their possible personal injury claim, check out our blog dedicated to these legal matters:

Louisiana Personal Injury Blog

This blog discusses the legal issues relating to Admiralty/Maritime law, Animal/Dog Bites, Car Accidents, Chemical/Industrial Spills, the intricacies of Expert Testimony, Insurance Disputes, employee rights under the Jones Act, Legal Duty, Civil Lawsuits, Criminal prosecution, Medical Malpractice, Mesothelioma/Asbestos, Motorcycle Injury, Negligence, Offshore Accidents, Product Defects, Chinese Drywall, Strict Liability, Workers’ Compensation and Wrongful Death. All of these issues are crucial to citizens rights and residents of Louisiana.