Articles Posted in Hurricane Insurance Verdicts

In insurance, an assignment is the transfer of legal rights under an insurance policy to another party. The legality of assignments became a major issue in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. During this period, the federal government, in an effort to aid rebuilding efforts, issued money through the Road Home program to homeowners who held underinsured properties. In exchange, these homeowners were required to assign their rights to insurance claims under their policies to the the state of Louisiana. The purpose of this assignment was to prevent homeowners from fraudulently receiving duplicate payments. However, the program incentivized insurance companies to estimate damages too low, which in turn forced homeowners to take the higher amount offered through the Road Home program.

The shortfall created within the Road Home program forced the state of Louisiana to bring suit against insurance companies through the policy rights assigned to the state by homeowners. In essence, the state sought to recoup actual insurance claim damages that the homeowners were rightfully owed had they not opted into the Road Home program. Though most, if not all, of the homeowner insurance policy contracts contained an anti-assignment clause, the state maintained that it had the right to post-loss assignment. Therefore, it is critical to distinguish between a pre-loss assignment and a post-loss assignment.

A pre-loss assignment occurs when one transfers a legal right under an insurance policy to another before the injury or loss occurs. An example of a type of pre-loss assignment is found in cases when life insurance is assigned to a bank as collateral for a loan. Here, the assignment has occurred before the loss, in this case the death of the original policy holder, and any benefits that accrue at the time of death are used to repay the bank first. These types of assignments typically require consent from the insurer, but are usually barred by anti-assignment clauses.

A post-loss assignment, on the other hand, is the transfer of a legal right under an insurance policy to another party after the injury or loss occurs. Post-loss assignments frequently give the third party transferee the ability to file a claim against the insurance company for any loss accrued by the original policy holder. Many insurance companies try to block such assignments through broad anti-assignment clauses found in policy contracts. Such clauses were found in most Katrina and Rita policies, and insurance companies pointed to these sections in an attempt to avoid paying actual damage costs homeowners thought they rightfully assigned to the state.

While national jurisprudence holds that pre-loss anti-assignment clauses are valid in favor of contract law and public policy, anti-assignment clauses related to post-loss assignments are held to be invalid. The reasoning behind this difference primarily lies with public policy considerations. A pre-loss assignment, for example, may increase the risk beyond the point that the insurance company had originally contracted for and with a party the insurance company had not originally contracted with. A post-loss assignment, on the other hand, simply assigns an accrued right to payment after a loss has already occurred. There is no change in risk as the loss has already occurred, and since payment is to be made it matters none to whom the payment is made.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana holds that such public policy concerns are better suited for the legislature. However, the Court does state that clauses prohibiting post-loss assignment must be written in clear and unambiguous language. If the language in the policy contract is unclear, then, in accordance with laws regarding contracts of adhesion, the language will be construed against the insurance company and in favor of the insured. If you have entered into a contract with an insurance company and are looking to assign your rights under the policy to a third party, turn to the language in the contract itself. Though there is not specific set of words or test used to determine “clear and unambiguous,” your own judgment is a good starting point in determining whether or not you have the right to assignment.

Though your own judgment is an excellent place to start, insurance law is very complicated and is best suited for a practicing attorney.

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Insurance policies routinely include provisions that are intended to limit the scope of the insurer’s coverage in the event of a claim by the policyholder. For instance, most homeowner’s insurance policies exclude coverage for fire damage that results from the policyholder’s deliberate arson. Commercial premises insurance policies, which commonly also include coverage for loss of business income, can carry similar limitations. The recent case of Berk-Cohen Associates, L.L.C. v. Landmark American Insurance Company in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provides an instructive example of how insurance policies are “construed using the general rules of interpretation of contracts” by the courts.

Berk-Cohen Associates, L.L.C., as the owner of the Forest Isle Apartments in New Orleans, maintained an insurance policy to cover the complex with the Landmark American Insurance Company. The policy covered property damage but specifically did not cover losses at Forest Isle “caused directly or indirectly by Flood.” In the case of a covered cause of loss, such as wind damage or fire, the policy insured Berk-Cohen against both the property damage and the resulting lost business income. However, the scope of the income protection excluded any income that would have been earned directly as a consequence of any “favorable business conditions caused by the impact of the Covered Cause of Loss on customers or on other businesses.” In other words, Berk-Cohen could not profit by a widespread calamity that was also the source of a property damage claims. Forest Isle suffered a series of misfortunes, including a tornado, a vehicle strike, and–most significant–damage from Hurricane Katrina. Following the hurricane, Landmark compensated Berk-Cohen for damages caused by wind but not flood. Concerning Berk-Cohen’s claim for lost business income, Landmark argued that it was not responsible for the increased rents that resulted from the extensive flooding around the city because flood damage was excluded from the policy. Accordingly, Landmark “declined to increase its calculation of lost business income to the extent that any foregone income arose from flooding.” Berk-Cohen initiated litigation and, following a bench trial, the district court held that, notwithstanding the flood damage exclusion in the policy, Landmark should have considered the business conditions attributable to flooding in other buildings when computing the business income that Berk-Cohen lost as a result of the wind damage to Forest Isle. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s opinion. It noted that the “Covered Cause of Loss” that gave rise to Berk-Choen’s property damage claim was wind. Consequently, the policy language prohibited Berk-Cohen from recovering for lost business income as a result of wind damage suffered by customers or other competing businesses. But, “any increase in customers’ demand or reduction in competitors’ supply due to flooding at other properties is a permissible factor in calculating lost business income.” (Emphasis supplied.) The court refused to permit Landmark to exclude coverage for flood damage by the policy language while at the same time invoking the same source of damage to reduce Berk-Cohen’s business income recovery. To do so would “extend[] the flood exclusion beyond its function,” since the policy specifically permits the income calculation to consider “favorable business conditions.” Accordingly, the court “decline[d] to use a limitation on coverage”–that is, flooding–“to alter the calculation of damages for a covered loss”–the lost income. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the “policy … excludes coverage for flood damages at the Forest Isle property. The flood exclusion does not, however, prevent Berk-Cohen from recovering lost business income due to the favorable business conditions arising from flood damage to other buildings.”

This case demonstrates that applying the “normal cannons of contract interpretation” can work to the benefit of the insured. As with any contract, the insurance company is bound by the plain meaning of the policy language, even if it means that excluding coverage for one claim will open the door to liability for another. The lesson here is that a knowledgeable and experienced attorney is invaluable to anyone who is involved in a dispute over insurance coverage.

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Nearly six years after Hurricane Katrina struck, Louisiana residents are still dealing with the traumatic and costly effects of the storm. The American Red Cross estimates that approximately 275,000 Louisiana homes were destroyed by the storm and thousands more were damaged. Even those homeowners with insurance can find the recovery of damages to be a difficult and definitely expensive process. This financial burden, regardless of the supposed
Many homeowners filing claims for damages were in for a nasty surprise: the “Named Storm Deductible.” Under Louisiana law, insurance companies can implement deductibles of as much as 5% of the value of the insured property for damage caused by “named storms,” including tropical storms and hurricanes such as Hurricane Gustav or Hurricane Katrina. Frequently these provisions have not appeared on the original policies, but were added during a policy renewal, meaning homeowners are unaware of its existence or don’t understand its implications.

Under a Named Storm Deductible of 5%, for example, damage caused to a home with an insured value of $100,000 would cost the homeowners a deductible of $5,000, rather than the standard $500 or $1,000 deductible ordinarily applied to such losses. Litigation arguing against and interpreting these deductibles can be complicated and frustrating.

Homeowners Mary Williams, Michael Manint, and Susan Manint ran into this problem firsthand when recovering from damage caused to their homes by Hurricane Katrina. While their policy from Republic Fire and Casualty Insurance Company includes a Named Storm Deductible of five percent (5%), it does not specifically designate what the 5% is to be taken from: the damage amount or the dwelling coverage limit. One year, when renewing their homeowners insurance, Republic sent them an Important Policyholder Notice explaining the application of the Named Storm Deductible. The Notice included an example of the Named Storm Deductible which showed that the deductible would be 5% of the dwelling coverage limit. This distinction, however, did not actually appear within the provisions of their policies.

After Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, Republic determined that Ms. Williams and the Manints would have to pay deductibles of $7,320 and $4,445, respectively, which were 5% of their dwelling coverage limits. Both homeowners, however, had expected to have to pay only 5% of the covered loss, which would have amounted to costs under $1,000.

Both homeowners filed suit against Republic, asserting that the company had miscalculated the Named Storm Deductible. They argued this on the theory that the Important Policyholder Notice, which showed that the 5% was to be taken from the dwelling coverage limit, could not be considered when interpreting the Named Storm Deductible. The district court however, disagreed and ruled in favor of Republic, confirming that the deductible had been calculated correctly.

On appeal, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. Under Louisiana law, because the Important Policyholder Notice was physically attached to the renewal policies, it was made a part of them as well. This meant that the Notice’s interpretation showing that the 5% was to be taken from the dwelling coverage limit was part of the policy and thus enforceable against the homeowners.

If you find yourself in a similar predicament, consulting with a legal expert may be your best chance in receiving the justice you deserve.

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If a homeowner insures his home and then suffers damage to the structure, the process of making a claim and being paid for the loss can be long and frustrating. Frequently, the insurance company will arrive at its value of the loss and attempt to persuade the homeowner to accept that value, even if it doesn’t reflect the homeowner’s actual costs of repair. In such a case, the homeowner should check his policy for an “appraisal clause.” This provision provides for an alternative method for setting the value of the property damage. An appraisal procedure requires the homeowner to obtain an independent appraiser to survey the damage and assign a value to the loss. Similarly, the insurance company must hire an independent appraiser to perform the same analysis. The two appraisers must petition the court for the appointment of an umpire who will then oversee the negotiation of the settlement based on the two appraisals. Once any two of the parties–the appraisers and/or the umpire–agree as to the value of the loss, the matter is settled.

In Louisiana, like other states, flood insurance policies are underwritten through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The NFIP authorizes private insurance companies to issue policies and handle the claim settlement process. Claims are actually paid by the federal government. FEMA requires that all NFIP flood insurance policies include an appraisal clause.

After their was heavily damaged by flood in Hurricane Katrina, William and Cynthia Dwyer filed a claim with their flood insurer, Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The Fidelity policy was issued through the NFIP. The Dwyers disagreed with Fidelity’s offer of settlement and took the dispute to the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The court entered judgment for the Dwyers, and on appeal by Fidelity, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and ordered the parties to submit to the appraisal process as outlined in the policy. The Dwyers and Fidelity sought appointment of an umpire, who then submitted to the district court an appraisal that included the amount of actual damage to the Dwyer home as well as a “mark-up for overhead and profit” intended to cover the cost of a general contractor to make the repairs. Fidelity accepted the umpire’s figure on damages but objected to the addition of the mark-up because the Dwyers had already sold the house and would not have any role in the repair itself. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Fidelity that “the award of overhead and profit was erroneous” and noted that “Fidelity told the district court that absent the improper award of overhead and profit, it agreed with the umpire’s appraisal.” Thus, determining that Fidelity and the umpire were in agreement on the amount of the loss, the court entered judgment ordering Fidelity to pay the Dwyers $1,552.51. This amount represented the umpire’s appraisal amount less the erroneous overhead and profit, the policy deductible, and the amount Fidelity had already paid out to the Dwyers.

The appraisal process seeks to take the potentially emotional settlement of an insurance claim out of the hands of the homeowner and the insurance company and leave the decision to disinterested, expert third parties who have no connection to the outcome. Although the process is generally more cost-effective and expedient than litigation, a homeowner should consult with an experienced attorney to ensure the procedure is properly followed and his rights are protected.

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Homeowners across the Louisiana coast were affected by Hurricane Katrina. Many of those affected are still dealing with the stressful experience of rebuilding their homes, communities, and lives. Homeowners insurance is a boon to many when natural disaster strikes. Unfortunately, insurance companies do not always make recovery of benefits easy on the afflicted homeowner. The insurance recovery process can be overwhelming, and may be complicated by the often necessary instigation of litigation. Insurance negotiations can be complicated by differing interpretations of policy provisions. Many different provisions governing recovery are involved in insurance contracts. The interpretation of the language of the contract by the court plays a pivotal role in deciding the amount of damages an insured is entitled to recover.

The recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case French v. Allstate Indemnity Co., illustrates that the recovery of damage benefits from an insurance company is not always a straight forward process. In French , homeowners in Slidell, Louisiana sued their homeowners insurance provider, Allstate Indemnity Co., to recover additional damages resulting from wind damage to their residence caused by Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiffs initially won a judgment in their favor in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana , but they appealed, arguing that they were entitled to additional damages beyond the original award. The insurance company paid less than the full amount of the liability limit under the homeowners insurance policy. The District Court held that, since their repair costs would exceed their policy limit, they were entitled to at least the full limit and awarded them judgment accordingly.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to further damages under two provisions of their policy, an Extended Limits Endorsement provision and an Additional Living Expenses provision. They argued that the lower court erred in denying them recovery under these provisions. The court applied Louisiana case law which dictates that the language of the policy controls and “constitutes the law between the insured and insurer.” When an insurance contract is subject to interpretation “‘[w]ords and phrases … are to be construed using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing meaning,’ unless the words have acquired a technical definition.” The appellate court reviewed the original award to determine if the lower court erred in their interpretation of these provisions and in denying recovery to the plaintiffs.

The Extended Limits Endorsement allowed for a certain amount of additional damages above and beyond the actual cash value of the insured’s home. The court found that the language of the provision indicated that, in order to recover under this provision, the insured had to show they had repaired or replaced their damaged property. They must also have insured their home to 100% of its value. The plaintiffs did not meet either of these requirements, and the court found the denial of an additional award under this provision was appropriate.

The Additional Living Expenses provision allowed for recovery of damages for “the reasonable increase in living expenses necessary to maintain [a] normal standard of living when a direct physical loss we cover . . . makes your residence premises uninhabitable.” The court determined that the plaintiffs had to show additional living expenses they had actually incurred. Since they had not yet begun repairs on their home, and continued to live in the residence, they were properly denied additional recovery under this provision.

Knowledge of the interpretation of insurance contract provisions is important when negotiating an insurance settlement or in litigation for recovery of damages. If you or a loved one has been affected by Hurricane Katrina you need an experienced law firm to help you navigate negotiations with your insurance company and to represent you in court should it be necessary. If you are looking for legal representation, the Berniard Law Firm has experience working with the victims of Hurricane Katrina and their families as well as a variety of storm and general insurance dispute issues.

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On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastate much of the Gulf Coast, prompting the Louisiana Legislature to enact Acts 2006, which extended the prescriptive period within which insured’s were allowed an additional year to file certain claims under their insurance policies for losses incurred by the storms. Despite many insurance contracts granting only one year for insured’s to file claims, this prescriptive period extension allowed many residents more time to file as a result of the difficult circumstances caused by the storm. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently were asked to determine whether the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, seeking damages from the Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (LCPIC), filed nearly three years after Hurricane Katrina had prescribed. In an earlier decision made by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, the prescriptive period was held to be interrupted by a timely filing of a class action petition against the insurer, which included the Plaintiffs as putative class members. Time is of the essence when filing lawsuits, here, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were timely and permitted to continue their lawsuit against LCPIC.

The plaintiffs, like so many other Gulf Coast residents, suffered extensive property damage as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Maneuvering through the insurance filing process became tedious and very difficult, the plaintiff’s constantly received refusals by the insurance company to make any payments on their policy limits. Thus, the plaintiff’s turned to legal help in order to obtain help to rebuild their homes and their lives. On June 27, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a petition against their insurer, LCPIC, seeking payment of their policy limits and damages, including damages for emotional distress and mental anguish. The allegations included: The plaintiff’s property was completely destroyed during the storm, the properties in question were covered by a policy of insurance issued by the defendant LCPIC, yet, the company refused to pay the policy limits. In response, LCPIC filed an Exception of Prescription, arguing that the suit was not filed within one year of loss and that the extended period of prescription provided by legislation had also expired. The trial court initially granted the defendant’s exception of prescription and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim with prejudice, finding that they had failed to file their claim timely. However, on appeal the trial court’s decision was reversed, the prescriptive period had been interrupted by the timely filing of a class action against the defendant insurer in which the Plaintiff’s were putative class members.

Prescription, as defined by Louisiana’s civilian tradition, is defined as a means of acquiring real rights or of losing certain rights as a result of the passage of time. In the case of Cichirillo v. Avondale Industries, Inc, the court reasoned that prescription is designed to “afford a defendant economic and psychological security if no claim is made timely and to protect the defendant from stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof.” Prescription itself is a safety measure that was created in order to prevent defendants from the constant fear of a lawsuit twenty or more years after the fact. Conversely, the other type of period that exists in Louisiana, is liberative prescription. This is a period of time fixed by law for the exercise of a right, yet, a contractual limitation period is not a period of time fixed by law, it is a fixed agreement between the parties. Time is of the essence, yet, there are exceptions to the rule, this is exemplified by the fact that Louisiana extended the initial one year prescriptive period for property damage claims against insurers, for one additional year, allowing victims fo Hurricane Katrina more time to organize the various aspects of their lives that were devastated by the storm.

The primary issue in this recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, was whether or not the class action suit in which the plaintiff’s were putative class members, interrupted prescription, thus, allowing them continued access to their legal claim against the insurance company. Louisiana civil code article 1793 states, “Any act that interrupts prescription for one of the solidary obligees benefits all the others.” Thus, by becoming putative class members in the initial lawsuit against the insurance company, the plaintiff’s maintained their legal claims against the defendants, allowing them to pursue further legal action against the company despite the passage of time. The court of appeal held that the filing of the class action suits against LCPIC suspended or interrupted the running of prescription against the plaintiff’s property damage claims since they were found to be putative class members when the original class action petitions were filed.

The defendant insurer argued that the contract, which provided one year from the date of the property damage, was the governing time period, even over the statutory extension provided by the Louisiana Legislature. The defendants supported this assertion by declaring that the public interest is served by permitting the insurer to limit the time of its exposure, as Louisiana Civil Code 802 states, “any suit not instituted within the specified time and any claims relating thereto, shall be forever barred unless a contract or the parties thereto provide for a later time.” However, even though the plaintiff’s did not unilaterally file a claim against the insurer within the one year contractual time period, they did enter into the class action against the insurer within the aforesaid time period. Upon the filing of the class action, liberative prescription on the claims arising out of the transaction or occurrences described in the petition were suspended as to all members of the class. The insurance contract provided a contractual time period, not a prescriptive time period, as a result, the additional one year time period afforded to Gulf Coast residents affected by the storm governs. The insurance company attempted to assert the contractual nature of its agreement to circumvent the application of the general codal and statutory rules of prescription is adverse to Louisiana civil Code Article 3471, which clearly circumscribes the limits of any contractual agreement attempting to incorporate a limitation period different from that established by law. Specifically, Louisiana Civil Code Article 3471 states:

A juridical act purporting to exclude prescrption, to specify a longer period than that established by law, or to make the requirements of prescription onerous, is null.

Thus, parties cannot “opt out” of prescriptive periods created by general codal and statutory rules. The plaintiff’s entered into a class action within the prescriptive time period, this interrupted the passage of time that would have taken away their legal rights to sue the insurer. Thus, the subsequent suit against the defendants was timely, and despite the contractual language that attempted to circumvent the Louisiana Legislature, the plaintiff’s filing was timely.

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Lake Charles resident Ginger Hinch Durio sued her Insurer, Horace Mann, over the extent of payments she received for the damages she sustained during Hurricane Rita. Durio’s house was severely damaged, including her garage where her family’s belongings were being stored while they were in talks to sell the house. The ceiling inside the garage collapsed onto their stored belongings. Additionally, an engineering report obtained by Durio four months after the hurricane indicated the structural and mechanical integrity of the house was compromised, and the HVAC, electrical, and plumbing systems had failed.

Durio’s policy with Horace Mann provided for several categories of damages for which the Insurer would pay her up to their respective policy limits: Structure ($173,300), Adjacent Structures ($17,330), Contents ($103,980), and Additional Living Expenses ($103,980). After Durio submitted a claim in September of 2005, Horace Mann made several payments to her that fell far below the category policy limits. Despite Durio’s submission of re-evaluation materials, Horace Mann ultimately honored in full only her Contents claim (for all the belongings contained in the garage) of $47,061.44. This, however, was after the Insurer issued her a “sarcastic” check for $6.90 for a broken flowerpot.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the damages awarded by the Trial Court for a total in excess of $1.5 million. Durio received Contractual damages for the difference between what she was paid by Horace Mann and the policy limits for Structure and Adjacent Structure damages. In addition, the Court affirmed an award of $39,000 for thirty-eight months of living expenses based on Durio’s own estimation for the period in which the Insurer worked on the claim.

By the terms of most mortgage agreements, homeowners are required to maintain adequate insurance on their houses. In New Orleans and other coastal areas, this requirement can include both a standard homeowner’s policy as well as flood insurance. Mortgage lenders insist on insurance coverage to help protect their financial interest in the properties for which they issue mortgages. If a borrower fails to purchase or maintain adequate coverage, the lender is permitted to “force-place” a policy–that is, to purchase an insurance policy on the property for its own benefit. A force-placed policy allows the lender to protect its exposure on a home up to the then-owed amount of mortgage on the date of issuance.

When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, the home of Latisha Williams sustained significant flood damage. Williams had purchased the house with a mortgage issued by Homecomings Financial, the terms of which required her to maintain a flood insurance policy on the property. In June of 2005, Williams let the flood policy lapse, at which point Homecomings Financial force-placed a new policy on the property that was issued by Lloyd’s of London. Following the Katrina disaster, a Lloyd’s adjuster inspected the property and issued a loss estimate that Williams believed was below the true amount of loss on the property. Williams sued Lloyd’s seeking to recover for the full amount of flood damage to the house. At trial in the district court, Lloyd’s filed a motion to dismiss Williams’s claim, arguing that she lacked standing to bring the action. Standing is the right to initiate a lawsuit which arises from the plaintiff’s direct connection with or involvement in a legal dispute. The district court granted Lloyd’s motion, and Williams appealed.

The Fifth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether Williams had standing to sue Lloyd’s. The issue centered around the question of whether the insurance policy, which was an agreement between Lloyd’s and Homecomings Financial, was intended to benefit Williams in any way. Without this intent to benefit Williams, she would have no standing to bring suit. Under Louisiana law, which the federal court applied, a contract for the benefit of a third party is called a “stipulation pour autrui.” See Paul v. Louisiana State Employees’ Group Benefit Program, 762 So.2d 136, 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000). According to the court, “[t]he most basic requirement of a stipulation pour autrui is that the contract manifests a clear intention to benefit the third party; absent such a clear manifestation, a party claiming to be a third party beneficiary cannot meet his burden of proof.” The court found ample evidence that Homecomings Financial and Lloyd’s did not intend to benefit Williams in any way. The court noted that the policy specifically stated that Homecomings Financial was the “sole insured” under the policy, notwithstanding “the insurable interests of the owner,” (Williams). Furthermore, the policy specified that Homecomings was Lloyd’s “sole insured under this policy” and that benefits paid would be “made directly to [Homecomings].” Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s action.

The lesson from this case is that a homeowner should always maintain the appropriate level of insurance for his or her property. Because a mortgage issuer is able to force-place a policy only up to the value of the outstanding balance on the mortgage, any equity the homeowner may have in the property is left unprotected in the event of a catastrophe. It is no stretch to imagine that a mortgage issuer would be happy to accept a settlement offer that covers its exposure without regard to any equity loss the homeowner may personally sustain.

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The Gulf Coast has seen its share of hurricanes and tropical storms, unfortunately, and nearly everyone who lives in our region knows someone who has been adversely affected by the damage these acts of nature cause. Whether a home, car, business or other form of property, many suffered devastating losses that left the future unclear. While those with insurance may have felt more relieved than those without, the fact remains that a wide variety of uphill battles exist.

If you are a Louisiana resident who suffered any type of injury relating to a storm, whether it was to your person or property, the courts have held a mixture of results that both reinforced and hindered claimants. Just a few weeks ago, a lawsuit was filed in Louisiana against Allstate Insurance in conjunction with a whistle blower alleging improper actions by the company.

The case, which is still pending in the courts, claims that Allstate cheated the federal government by creating false data that steered the majority of costs toward the National Flood Insurance Program. The lawsuit accuses Allstate, a major participant in the government’s Write Your Own Program, of fabricating damage documents. Allegedly, Allstate “substantially inflated” the flood portion of damages while “substantially deflating” the homeowners insurance claims. This means that the company may have also been shifting numbers away from the claims of homeowners, forcing them to either settle for the offer substantially less than they deserved or hire attorneys to get them proper compensation.

As many Gulf Coast residents unfortunately know, standard homeowner’s insurance policies do not include coverage for flooding. In order to assist property owners in Louisiana and other states in protecting themselves against floods from hurricanes, tropical storms, and other severe weather, Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968. NFIP offers flood insurance to homeowners, renters, and commercial property owners in communities that participate in the NFIP. In order for a community to be eligible to participate, it must agree to adopt and enforce certain building standards that are designed to reduce the risk of flood damage. According to the NFIP, flood damage is reduced by nearly $1 billion each year as a result of the floodplain management standards implemented by these communities. Also, structures that are built to NFIP standards experience approximately 80 percent less damage annually than those not built to the standards. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages the administrative functions of the NFIP, including the claims process. As one Katrina victim recently learned, homeowners who file claims under the NFIP must closely follow the rules contained in their policies.

Violet Collins, a resident of New Orleans, maintained a flood insurance policy through the NFIP to cover her house and its contents. The structure was insured for $225,000 and the contents for $12,500. When the home sustained flood damage during Hurricane Katrina, Collins contacted FEMA to provide notification of the damage. FEMA sent an adjuster to her house to inspect the damage and arrange for payment from FEMA. Collins later submitted additional documentation for damage that the adjuster had overlooked, and FEMA issued her two more checks. Some time later, Collins filed a suit against the NFIP which alleged that the payments on her flood claims were insufficient. The NFIP filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Collins failed to file a proof of loss as required by the insurance policy and was therefore barred from seeking additional money. The district court granted NFIP’s motion, and Collins appealed.

After reaffirming that it must “strictly construe and enforce” the flood policy’s requirements, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that “an insured’s failure to provide a complete, sworn proof of loss statement, as required by the flood insurance policy, relieves the federal insurer’s obligation to pay what otherwise might be a valid claim.” Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1998). The court noted that, ordinarily, the proof must be submitted within 60 days of the loss, but that FEMA extended the window for Hurricane Katrina claims to one year. Nevertheless, Collins never submitted any proof of loss; the court examined Collins’s arguments for why she was not required to file one. Her first argument was that FEMA had waived the requirement altogether, a contention that the court quickly dispensed with by citing well-settled case law on the same question. Second, Collins asserted that the NFIP waived the filing requirement in a letter she received from an insurance adjuster. However, the court concluded this was not possible because “federal regulations provide that no provision of the policy may be altered, varied, or waived without the express written consent of the Federal Insurance Administrator,” which was not given. Finally, Collins argued that because she suffers from a debilitating eye disease, she was excused from observing the filing requirement. In response, the unsympathetic court stated that “Collins, however, fails to explain why Louisiana tort law would apply to her claim for flood insurance proceeds or why, if applicable, this would exempt her from our precedent requiring strict compliance with the … proof-of-loss requirements.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Collins’s suit.

This case serves as a reminder that, even in the aftermath of such massive natural disasters as Hurricane Katrina, flood victims are still expected to follow the specific requirements of their NFIP insurance policies when seeking payment for flood-related losses. Although it may seem cruel to reject a flood victim’s appeal for a fair pay-out, the courts have put policyholders on notice that they will not entertain requests to alter the terms of the policies. For this reason, victims of any flood should seek the help of a qualified attorney who can help them navigate the steps required to fully collect on their flood insurance policies.

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