Articles Posted in Legal Definitions

car_racing_crash_accident-scaledUnder Louisiana law, there is a presumption the driver of a car that rear-ends another car acted negligently. However, this presumption of negligence can be overcome in certain situations, such as if the driver of the vehicle that was rear-end shifted lanes soon before the accident.

While Tammy Bloxham was stopped at a red light in her car, she was hit from behind by Andy Gibbs Jr. At the time of the accident, Gibbs was driving a tractor-trailer owned by 31 Energy. Bloxham filed a lawsuit against Gibs, 31 Energy, and 31 Energy’s insurer. Bloxham argued 31 Energy had been negligent in hiring Gibbs and not inspecting its vehicle’s brakes. The defendants filed a summary judgment motion, claiming Bloxham had not reported this claim in her pending bankruptcy. Bloxham also filed a summary judgment motion, claiming Gibbs was liable under La. R.S. 32:81 A and the presumed negligence of the driver of a following vehicle who hits the rear of another vehicle.

The trial court granted Bloxham’s summary judgment motion given the presumption that a following driver who rear ends another vehicle is negligent. The court held this applied even if Bloxham had changed lanes immediately before the accident. The defendants filed an appeal.

labor_farmer_village_workThe distinction between independent contractors and employees has always been something of a balancing test. This distinction becomes vital in workers’ compensation issues, where employees generally enjoy peace of mind with workers’ compensation in the event of an injury, whereas independent contractors usually do not. But are there some cases where an independent contractor can collect workers’ compensation benefits? The answer to this question is illustrated in the following appeal from the New Orleans Office of Workers’ Compensation.

Federico Espinoza Martinez and four others were hired by Jaroslov Rames to lower a washer/dryer combination unit to the first floor of an apartment building. During the lowering of the unit, Mr. Martinez received a laceration on his hand when one of the ropes used snapped. Despite a broken rope and cut hand, Mr. Martinez and the others completed the job. Afterward, Mr. Rames drove Mr. Martinez to the emergency room, paying five hundred dollars to ensure proper treatment was administered. Mr. Martinez later attempted to collect his pay from Mr. Rames. Mr. Rames informed him that he had deducted the five-hundred-dollar emergency room fee from Mr. Martinez’s check and planned to deduct the remainder of the hospital fee from his future earnings.

Mr. Martinez filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits he believed Mr. Rames owed him. The issue was heard by the Office of Workers’ Compensation (henceforth “OWC”), and it was found that Mr. Martinez was not an employe of Mr. Rames, but rather an independent contractor. Benefits were denied based on this finding. Mr. Martinez appealed, maintaining that the OWC failed to apply the manual labor exception outlined in La. R.S. 23:1021(7). The OWC found the manual labor exception did not apply to the set of facts, denying benefits again for Mr. Martinez.

house_architecture_brick_door_0-scaledIn order to recover under a homeowner’s policy, there are many requirements with which you must comply. One common requirement is providing the insurer with requested documentation and undergoing an examination under oath where the insurer can ask questions and gather information relevant to the claim. What happens if a homeowner delays undergoing an examination under oath?

Jesse and Dena McCartney’s house was destroyed in a fire. They filed a claim with Shelter Mutual Insurance, who issued their homeowner’s policy. Their policy required that they cooperate with the insurer, including answering questions under oath and submitting proof of loss. The McCartneys filed a lawsuit against Shelter for refusing to pay them anything. 

Shelter filed a summary judgment motion, arguing the McCartneys had not provided the required requested information and had refused to submit to an examination under oath. The McCartneys claimed they had not refused to cooperate with the investigation and had submitted documentation and recorded statements. They also claimed they had only postponed the examination under oath, not refused it. They noted Shelter had requested an examination under oath more than sixty days after the McCartneys submitted their proof of loss, which was after the time by when Shelter was required to pay them or make a settlement offer. The trial court granted Shelter’s summary judgment motion, explaining the McCartneys had voided their policy by not submitting to an examination under oath. The McCartneys filed an appeal. 

usps_mcveytown_pa_17051-scaledNo one should have to deal with sexual harassment in the workplace. If you are dealing with sexual harassment at work and you report it to your employer, you hope they will act on your report. How do actions taken by your employer affect your ability to recover for sexual harassment in court?

Shelita Tucker worked for UPS in Port Allen, Louisiana for three years. One of the subordinates she managed was Larry McCaleb. Tucker claimed McCaleb sexually harassed her for about two years. His alleged sexual harassment involved inappropriate touching. Soon after the incident with the inappropriate touching, Tucker reported what had happened to the business manager. McCaleb was taken out of service while the investigation was ongoing. The next day, Tucker filed a complaint with the UPS Compliance Line. She subsequently also filed a report with the local police department. 

The next week, Tucker was on a scheduled vacation. While she as on vacation, UPS investigated the matter and suspended McCaleb. When McCaleb was allowed to return to work, UPS took corrective action including meeting with McCaleb, counseling him about proper behavior and relevant policies, and prohibiting him from going near Tucker. McCaleb was also convicted of battery and sentenced to 90-days in jail. Tucker reported McCaleb never talked to or touched her again. The one-time McCaleb entered her work area, she reported it and UPS addressed it. Tucker claimed she still felt unsafe at work because McCaleb also worked at the facility. However, she said she was still about to perform her job. She claimed McCaleb would stare at her as she walked in or out of work. 

rim_tire_wheel_round-scaledIn the heart of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, tragedy struck on Interstate 10 as a routine drive turned fatal. Arthur Huguley, behind the wheel of a tractor-trailer for AAA Cooper Transportation, found himself in a situation that would forever alter the lives of those involved. A blown-out tire, a series of events, and a wrongful death lawsuit brought forth by Curley Mouton’s surviving family members set the stage for a courtroom drama that unfolded with unexpected twists. In the end, a jury assigned fault, but the defendants, Huguley, AAA Cooper, and their insurer, were not ready to accept the verdict without a fight. This article explores the intricacies of their appeal, shedding light on the compelling arguments presented and the complexities of apportioning fault in a tragic accident.

Arthur Huguley was driving a tractor-trailer in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, on Interstate 10 while working for AAA Cooper Transportation (“AAA Cooper”).  Huguley heard a bang and worried he might have blown out a tire. While performing a maneuver to see if he had blown out a tire, the tire that had blown out came apart and flew into the air. Curley Mouton was driving in a truck behind Huguley when debris from the tire started flying through the air. The debris hit Mouton’s truck, causing him to hit a guardrail, flip over, and crash. Mouton died in the crash. 

Mouton’s surviving spouse and son filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Huguley, AAA Cooper, and their insurer. A jury found in favor of Mouton’s family and assigned 10% fault to Huguley and 90% to AAA Cooper for putting a defective tire on its truck. The defendants appealed, claiming the jury had erred in its ruling.

dsc05934_0-scaledDealing with the aftermath of a flood is never fun. This is especially true when the flood damages one of your vehicles. This is the situation Michael Jacobs found himself in after one of his cars was damaged in a flood. After a long fight with his insurance company, he eventually prevailed and was awarded damages. 

Jacobs owned multiple vehicles that GEICO insured. His parish in North Louisiana was affected by heavy flooding. When the flooding started, Jacobs and his brother tried to move the vehicles from his house to higher ground but were unable to remove them before the floodwaters rose, so they could not drive up to the house. Jacobs waded through the floodwater to retrieve one of the vehicles, a 2001 Honda Accord. In the days following the flood, the Honda kept overheating. Jacobs claimed this had only occurred after the flood. 

Jacobs submitted a claim to GEICO for the damage to the vehicle. The insurance inspector did not identify any flood-related problems and determined the upper radiator hose had blown out. Another mechanic gave Jacobs an opinion and concluded there were issues with his spark plugs. GEICO ultimately denied Jacobs’ claim because it had suffered a mechanical failure that was not flood-related. Jacobs filed a lawsuit against GEICO, alleging his Honda had been damaged from the flooding. At trial, the court ruled the Honda had suffered water damage and awarded vehicle property damages and attorney fees. GEICO filed an appeal.

courthouse_311_jarvis_st-scaledWhen you think about medical malpractice lawsuits, a botched surgery or missed diagnosis are likely the first things that come to mind. The following case involves a less common situation involving purported medical malpractice involving physical therapy post-surgery. It analyzes the relationship between a doctor and a physical therapist and whether a doctor can be vicariously liable for the actions of a physical therapist.

Jean McKeogh underwent a total shoulder arthroplasty, which Dr. Michael O’Brien performed. Following the surgery, Dr. O’Brien saw McKeogh for office visits at a Tulane University clinic. Part of McKeogh’s follow-up care involved physical therapy, which was located in the same building as Dr. O’Brien’s offices. McKeogh went to physical therapy but subsequently told Dr. O’Brien she thought she had been injured during it. A CT scan showed she had fractured her elbow. McKeough then had a frozen shoulder and had to have a second surgery. 

As a result of the injury and alleged negligence, McKeough requested a medical review panel. In her complaint, she claimed Dr. O’Brien had not used reasonable care with respect to his post-surgery care for her, including with respect to the physical therapy he prescribed. The medical review panel determined Robin Silverman, the physical therapist, had not satisfied the applicable standard of care. However, the medical review panel found there was no evidence to support a finding that Dr. Brien and Tulane had not met the applicable standard of care. 

ladder_art_red_garden-scaledIt can be challenging to interpret insurance policies, especially when they involve complex provisions such as coverage for an additional insured. Before signing an insurance policy, it is imperative to understand its language and what it does and does not cover. Here, the plain language of the insurance policy proved instrumental in the appellate court’s ruling.

Pamela Sloane was injured while working for Integrity Cleaning Services (“Integrity”) at Forestwood Apartments. She was cleaning a ceiling fan while standing on a ladder. She inadvertently touched an exposed wire, which electrocuted her, and she fell from the ladder. Sloane filed a lawsuit against CLK Multifamily Management (“CLK”) and others. Sloane claimed CLK had not adequately maintained the premises or warned of the dangerous condition of the exposed wire. CLK filed its answer to the lawsuit, denying the allegations, and added Travelers Indemnity (“Travelers”) to the lawsuit.  CLK claimed Integrity was contractually required to have a general liability insurance policy that covered CLK as additional insureds. 

Travelers filed a summary judgment motion, claiming CLK was not an additional insured under the policy. Travelers attached a copy of the relevant insurance policy to its summary judgment motion. CLK disagreed and claimed it was indeed an additional insured.  The trial court concluded CLK was not qualified as an additional insured and granted Travelers’ summary judgment motion. 

green_mold_harmful_moldIf you have experienced symptoms from working in a moldy work environment, you might think you are entitled to recover from your employer. However, navigating the Workers’ Compensation system can be challenging partly because of the distinct and often complicated vocabulary in the statutes. This case involves defining an occupational disease under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.

Angela Lyle worked in the payroll department at Brock Services. Her office was in a trailer in Norco, Louisiana, at the Valero plant. Lyle claimed she saw mold throughout the trailer that increased over the two years she worked at the site. She suffered from fatigue, burning eyes, sores, and other symptoms. After suffering a nosebleed, she underwent a medical evaluation. Testing confirmed mold was present in the office, so Lyle’s trailer was replaced. Once the trailer was replaced, some of Lyle’s symptoms went away, but others persisted, and new symptoms emerged. 

She resigned and was diagnosed with sarcoidosis in her lungs and lymph nodes. She then filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation, claiming she had suffered an occupational disease and was entitled to damages. The workers’ compensation judge denied her claim as neither her mold exposure nor the development of sarcoidosis qualified as an occupational disease or accident under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. Brock filed a summary judgment motion, arguing Lyle could not establish sarcoidosis was an occupational disease. The workers’ compensation judge granted Brock’s summary judgment motion, finding Lyle’s sarcoidosis was not an “occupational disease. Lyle appealed, arguing the workers’ compensation judge ignored the definition of an “occupational disease” under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.

ladder_step_ladder_passage-scaledStatutory employer immunity is critical in determining liability and compensation for workplace injuries in workers’ compensation. The following case is an example where the court had to decide whether the defendant was entitled to statutory employer immunity under the dual contract theory provided for in La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(2). We will examine the facts of the case, the arguments presented by both parties and the court’s decision. We will also examine the legal framework surrounding statutory employer immunity and its impact on workers’ compensation cases.

The case involves Patrick Cummins, a worker hired by a subcontractor to perform its contract with R.A.H. Homes and Construction, LLC (“R.A.H.”), the defendant. The homeowners had contracted R.A.H. to construct a single-family home, including the installation of an attic HVAC system. Cummins became seriously injured when the attic access ladder malfunctioned, and he fell while performing the work required under R.A.H.’s contract with the homeowners.

Cummins sued several defendants, including R.A.H., in tort, alleging that R.A.H. was directly responsible for the improper installation of the attic ladder that led to the accident. In response, R.A.H. asserted an affirmative defense of statutory employer immunity under La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(2), claiming that a statutory relationship existed through the two-contract theory.

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